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Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to take up the role in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Brexit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is occurring in France, now on its sixth premier in two years – with three in the last ten months?

The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is locked in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for decades – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no simple way out.

Minority Rule

Key background: ever since Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly separated into three warring blocs – left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – none with anything close to a majority.

At the same time, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to pass a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are nigh.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In September, the president appointed his close ally Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

So much so that the next day, he stepped down. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he blamed political intransigence, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The leader's team confirmed the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those votes, due on Thursday.

It is, however, far from guaranteed to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be demanding further compromises. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, like his predecessors, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Although, by an unlikely turn, the divided parliament summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Early elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his successor would disband the assembly and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having elected a far-right president, might think twice about handing them control of parliament.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that transformation will not be possible under the country’s current constitution. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”